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Abstract—Deep neural networks are capable of training fast
and generalizing well within many domains. Despite their promis-
ing performance, deep networks have shown sensitivities to per-
turbations of their inputs (e.g., adversarial examples) and their
learned feature representations are often difficult to interpret,
raising concerns about their true capability and trustworthiness.
Recent work in adversarial training, a form of robust opti-
mization in which the model is optimized against adversarial
examples, demonstrates the ability to improve performance
sensitivities to perturbations and yield feature representations
that are more interpretable. Adversarial training, however, comes
with an increased computational cost over that of standard (i.e.,
nonrobust) training, rendering it impractical for use in large-
scale problems. Recent work suggests that a fast approximation
to adversarial training shows promise for reducing training time
and maintaining robustness in the presence of perturbations
bounded by the infinity norm. In this work, we demonstrate
that this approach extends to the Euclidean norm and preserves
the human-aligned feature representations that are common for
robust models. Additionally, we show that using a distributed
training scheme can further reduce the time to train robust
deep networks. Fast adversarial training is a promising approach
that will provide increased security and explainability in machine
learning applications for which robust optimization was previ-
ously thought to be impractical.
Index Terms—robust, adversarial, distributed, explainable,
deep learning, neural network
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the significant promise of machine learning for
a wide array of domains, many machine learning models–
notably deep neural networks [1]–[5]–have proven to be
vulnerable to inputs that have been perturbed in a small but
deliberate way, commonly referred to as adversarial examples
or attacks [6]–[8]. Additionally, interpreting deep networks
remains an open challenge [9]. Robustness and interpretability
are important characteristics for machine learning models used
in safety- and security-critical applications [10]–[12].
Many approaches have been proposed to address the vulner-
ability posed by adversarial examples such as modifying the
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training data [13], [14], altering the network architecture [15],
or by defensive distillation [16]. Yet these defenses are often
defeated by subsequent adversarial attack methods [17]–[19].
One defense that has emerged from this “arms race” of attack
and defense development is the use of adversarial training (first
introduced in [8], with its connection to robust optimization
discussed in [14], [20], [21]). The most common form of
adversarial training uses robust optimization with projected
gradient descent (PGD) to generate adversarial examples
within the training loop [20].
In addition to improving robustness to adversarial attacks,
when used with the Euclidean norm, adversarial training
imposes a prior that is closely aligned with human visual
perception, resulting in trained networks with more inter-
pretable feature representations [22]–[24]. Adversarial training
can therefore be used to not only increase the security of
machine learning systems, but also help in scenarios where
explanations are needed to increase operator trust.
Unfortunately, generating adversarial examples within the
training loop comes with a significant computational cost.
This increased cost may be hindering progress in robust
model development and application of it to complex, real
world problems. Recent work, however, has demonstrated that
fast adversarial training may be possible without sacrificing
robustness [25], [26]. Additionally, distributed computing has
been shown to speed up training time significantly for many
large scale, deep learning problems [27], [28].
In this paper, we extend the work from [26] by applying
their fast adversarial training approach to the Euclidean norm.
We then train robust models using this approach with dis-
tributed training using multiple GPUs, and assess their training
time, robustness, and learned feature representations using the
CIFAR-10 [29] and Restricted ImageNet [22] datasets. We
establish that fast adversarial training preserves robustness
and interpretability, demonstrating promise for large-scale
problems that necessitate machine learning solutions that are
robust, explainable, and efficient to train.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adversarial Perturbations
Given a machine learning model (e.g., deep neural network),
fθ, parameterized by θ, an input example, x, and true label,
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y, an adversarial perturbation, δ, is found by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
δ∈S
L(fθ(x+ δ), y) (1)
where L is the loss function (e.g., cross-entropy) and S is
the space of allowable perturbations, often constrained by an
`p-norm.
Introduced in [8], one of the first methods proposed to
approximate the solution to (1) assumes S = {δ : ||δ||∞ ≤ }
and is known as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM).
Adversarial perturbations are generated by FGSM as follows:
δ∗ =  · sign(∇xL(fθ(x), y)) (2)
where ∇xL is the gradient of the loss function with respect
to the input.
A more accurate approximation to (1) extends FGSM by
taking K steps of size α and projecting the perturbation onto
S at each iteration:
δ(k+1) = ΠS(δ)
(
δ(k) + α · ∇xL(fθ(x+ δ(k)), y)
)
(3)
δ∗ = δ(K) (4)
where ΠS(δ) represents the projection of δ onto S. This
multi-step approach is known as projected gradient descent1
(PGD) [20]. The initial perturbation for PGD, δ(0), can be
started from the origin, or sampled randomly from S.
PGD is able to produce a perturbation that is closer to the
optimal solution of (1) compared to single-step FGSM by
taking multiple steps of gradient descent, and converges to
the optimal solution as K → ∞. While FGSM assumes the
infinity norm, PGD is agnostic to the choice of S , and is thus
a more general formulation for an adversarial attack.
B. Adversarial Training
To increase the robustness of deep neural networks, adver-
sarial training (first suggested in [8] and formalized in [20])
adds adversarial examples into the training procedure by re-
formulating standard training into a robust min-max optimiza-
tion problem:
min
θ
∑
i∈D
max
δ∈S
L(fθ(xi + δ), yi) (5)
where D is the training dataset. Similar to standard training,
the outer minimization is solved at each iteration of training
by updating the model weights, θ, using an optimizer such as
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), but with the loss computed
on the adversarially-perturbed inputs:
θ ← θ − η · 1
N
N∑
i=1
∇θL(fθ(xi + δ∗i ), yi) (6)
where N is the number of data samples used for the stochastic
update (e.g., batch size), and η is the learning rate. Adversarial
training using FGSM was shown to be insufficient when
tested against a stronger adversary such as PGD [20]. Thus,
adversarial training with PGD is the preferred method for
training robust models.
1More precisely, projected gradient descent on the negative loss function.
C. Robust Feature Representations
Approaches for increasing the interpretability of deep neural
networks are often aimed at improving the learned feature
representations [30], [31]. In [22], the authors claim that
adversarial perturbations are not bugs in the deep learning
model, but nonrobust features that the model has found
useful for maximizing accuracy during the standard training
procedure. They show that robust models trained with PGD
and the Euclidean norm tend to learn more robust feature
representations compared to standard models, and these robust
features tend to align more closely with human cognition.
From a human perception standpoint, inputs that are close in
input space should yield feature representations that are also
close:
||x− x′||2 ≤  =⇒ ||fRθ (x)− fRθ (x′)|| ≤ C ·  (7)
where fRθ (x) is the feature representation of x extracted by the
model (e.g., the penultimate layer of a neural network) and C
is a constant. This expression is very similar to the definition
of adversarial robustness, so it follows that adversarial training
provides a way to enforce a prior on the model for learning
more human-aligned features [22], [23].
This insight opens up the doors to a number of remark-
able observations and powerful tools that can be used on
adversarially-trained models: inverting similar feature repre-
sentations leads to perceptually similar inputs; visualizing the
images that maximally-activate representation nodes reveal
patterns that are recognizable by humans; performing large,
targeted PGD attacks can be used to debug model errors or
add features to an input that resemble specific classes [23],
[32]. We will use a sampling of these tools to qualitatively
demonstrate that our robust models also have these properties.
D. Fast Adversarial Training
Using PGD during adversarial training is expensive due to
the many gradient computations required to solve the inner
maximization in (5). Thus, scaling adversarial training to larger
datasets and more complex problems is impractical without
significant computational resources.
Alternative approaches to multi-step PGD are being ex-
plored to speed up adversarial training. One such approach,
referred to as “free” adversarial training [25], proposes using
a single backwards pass to simultaneously solve for the input
perturbation and update the model parameters. While this
prevents multiple perturbation steps for a given pass, the
method overcomes this by training with the same mini-batch
T times so that each input is allowed multiple adversarial
updates. Additionally, the optimal perturbations from one
mini-batch are used as an initialization for the next mini-batch.
The total number of epochs can be reduced by a factor of T to
make computational cost around the same as that of standard
training. Empirical results show that a robust model trained
with free adversarial training performs just as well against
PGD-generated attacks.
In [26], the authors hypothesize that the primary driver of
the success of free adversarial training is the initialization
of the perturbation from the previous mini-batch, which they
claim serves as a form of randomization that allows a simpler
attack to achieve similar robustness to PGD. With this hy-
pothesis, [26] revisits FGSM for adversarial training, with the
simple modification of randomly initializing the perturbation
before taking the gradient step:
δ0 ∼ Uniform(−, ) (8)
δ1 = δ0 + α · sign(∇xL(fθ(x+ δ0), y)) (9)
δ∗ = max(min(δ1, ),−). (10)
The authors observe that the random initialization allows
their “fast” adversarial training approach to yield comparable
performance to PGD-trained models, even when tested against
strong adversaries, suggesting that the FGSM approximation
to the inner maximization of (5) may be sufficient for training
robust models. Thus, there may be no need to sacrifice
robustness for lower computational cost.
Both of the aforementioned fast training approaches as-
sume a constraint on the infinity norm when training their
robust models. We will extend the approach from [26] to
the Euclidean norm, to explore if the conclusions hold when
considering other norm-bounded constraints, and to investi-
gate if human-aligned feature representations are attainable at
reduced computational cost.
III. FAST ADVERSARIAL TRAINING WITH CONSTRAINT
ON EUCLIDEAN NORM
Fast adversarial training with the Euclidean norm is com-
pleted as follows. First, define the space of allowable pertur-
bations as the `2-ball, S2, = {δ : ||δ||2 ≤ }. An adversarial
perturbation is solved for using a single step of PGD with
random initialization sampled uniformly from S2,:
δ(0) ∼ Uniform(S2,) (11)
δ(1) = δ(0) + α · ∇xL(fθ(x+ δ
(0)), y)
||∇xL(fθ(x+ δ(0)), y)||2 (12)
δ∗ =
{
 · δ(1)/||δ(1)||2 if ||δ(1)||2 > 
δ(1) otherwise
(13)
where the gradient is normalized such that α controls the size
of the step in (12).
The solution to the robust optimization problem in (5) is
approximated by alternating between computing these fast
perturbations using (11)–(13), and updating the model weights
according to (6). This process is described in Algorithm 1,
where training data is divided into M mini-batches of size N
and training repeats for E epochs. In practice, Lines 3–9 of
Algorithm 1 are executed over the entire batch in parallel.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We empirically compare fast adversarial training (i.e., 1-
step PGD) to training with 7 steps of PGD for perturbations
constrained by the Euclidean norm. Our models are trained
on the MIT Supercloud2, which provides compute nodes
2https://supercloud.mit.edu/
Algorithm 1 Fast adversarial training with perturbations con-
strained by the `2-norm. Inputs are assumed to be mapped to
the [0, 1] domain.
1: for e = 1, . . . , E do
2: for m = 1, . . . ,M do
3: for i = 1, . . . , N do
4: Solve for adversarial perturbation:
5: δi ∼ Uniform(S2,)
6: δi = δi + α · ∇xL(fθ(xi+δi),y)||∇xL(fθ(xi+δi),yi)||2
7: δi = δi.renorm(p = 2,maxnorm = )
8: δ∗i = clamp(δi, 0− xi, 1− xi)
9: end for
10: Update model weights:
11: θ ← θ − η · 1N
∑N
i=1∇θL(fθ(xi + δ∗i ), yi)
12: end for
13: end for
composed of two NVIDIA Volta V100 Graphics Processing
Units (GPUs), 20 Intel Xeon Gold 20-core Central Processing
Units (CPUs), and 384GB of RAM. We compare training
using a single compute node (total of 2 GPUs) to training
using 4 compute nodes (8 GPUs) utilizing the distributed
data parallel method implemented in PyTorch [33] along with
PyTorch Lightning [34].
We use two datasets for our experiments: CIFAR-10 [29]
and Restricted ImageNet [22]. CIFAR-10 is composed of
images of size 32x32 grouped into 10 classes (airplane,
automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck).
The CIFAR-10 dataset contains 50,000 samples for training
and 10,000 for validation. Restricted ImageNet, originally
introduced in [22], groups subsets of classes from ImageNet
[35] into 10 super-classes (dog, cat, frog, turtle, bird, primate,
fish, crab, and insect). With images of size 256x256 (cropped
to 224x224 for input to the models), Restricted ImageNet rep-
resents a higher resolution alternative to CIFAR-10. Restricted
ImageNet contains 257,735 samples for training and 10,150
for validation.
For both datasets, we use a 50-layer residual network archi-
tecture [36], which contains roughly 23 million parameters. We
use Madrylab’s robustness package [37] to train and evaluate
our models. All models are trained for 150 epochs, with
global batch sizes of 256. Performance on the validation set
is evaluated every 5 epochs. We use SGD to optimize the
model weights with an initial learning rate of 0.1, momentum
of 0.9, and weight decays of 5e-4 and 1e-4 for CIFAR-10 and
Restricted ImageNet, respectively. Learning rates are reduced
by 10x every 50 epochs.
We use an adversarial step size of α = 1.5 ·  for generating
fast adversarial perturbations with 1-step PGD (informed by
recommendations from [26]) and α = 2.5 · /K when using
K-step PGD (the default in [37]), and perturbations are
randomly initialized for both 1- and K-step PGD. CIFAR-
10 and Restricted ImageNet models are trained to be robust
to perturbations of size  = 1.0 and  = 3.0, respectively.
TABLE I
TRAINING TIMES IN HOURS (RELATIVE TO 2-GPU, NO PGD)
Dataset Approach Last Epoch Best Epoch
2-GPU 8-GPU 2-GPU 8-GPU
CIFAR
7-Step PGD 9.1 (7.4) 3.0 (2.4) 6.4 (5.2) 1.3 (1.1)
1-Step PGD 2.9 (2.3) 1.1 (0.9) 1.4 (1.2) 0.5 (0.5)
No PGD 1.2 (1.0) 0.7 (0.6) 0.9 (0.7) 0.5 (0.4)
Restricted
ImageNet
7-Step PGD4 127.5 (7.1) 38.8 (2.2) – 2.6 (0.2)
1-Step PGD 39.8 (2.2) 12.9 (0.7) 17.3 (0.9) 10.9 (0.6)
No PGD 17.7 (1.0) 8.4 (0.5) 12.3 (0.7) 5.5 (0.3)
A. Training Time
Refer to Table I for the training times for adversarial training
with 7- and 1-step PGD compared to standard (i.e., no PGD)
training for CIFAR-10 and Restricted ImageNet with 2 and
8 GPUs. Training times are reported for both the last epoch
(150) and the “best” epoch, which is the epoch that achieves
the highest adversarial accuracy3 on the validation set.
With roughly a 3x speedup on both datasets for 2-GPU,
fast adversarial training with 1-step PGD significantly reduces
the time to train an `2-robust model compared to 7-step
PGD, and is roughly only 2x slower than standard training.
Requiring 7x the gradient computations per batch compared
to standard training, 7-step PGD is roughly 7x longer than
standard. Additional speedups in training time are evident
when comparing 2- and 8-GPU training. For the 8-GPU case,
fast adversarial training is approximately as fast as standard
training, and training with 7-step PGD requires roughly twice
as long as standard.
To better understand the drivers of the speedup when
switching from 7- to 1-step PGD, we compute the time to
execute PGD over varying batch sizes on a single GPU for
the CIFAR-10 dataset. We also compute the time to execute a
single forward pass through the network to serve as a proxy
for standard (i.e., no PGD) training. These results are shown
in the left plot of Figure 1. Note that decreasing the batch size
has diminishing returns on the PGD processing time.
Next, we use these values to estimate the total time re-
quired for PGD executions over the entire training process
(including 150 epochs of training and 150/5 = 30 epochs
of validation), which represents a lower bound on the total
training time. These estimates, shown in the middle plot of
Figure 1, demonstrate that increasing batch size reduces the
overall training time. While smaller batches reduce execution
time for a single instance of PGD, larger batches reduce the
total number of iterations per epoch (and subsequently the total
number of executions of PGD).
There are diminishing returns with increasing batch size
when computing PGD with a single GPU, thus a greater
reduction in training time can be achieved by using distributed
processing on multiple GPUs. This concept is illustrated in the
right plot of Figure 1, where we estimate a lower bound on
3Adversarial accuracy is the average accuracy on adversarially-perturbed
samples from the test set
4Training did not complete for 7-step PGD on Restricted ImageNet with 2
GPUs, so its time for the last epoch is an estimate and the time for the best
epoch is unavailable.
the total training time for varying numbers of GPUs given a
global batch size of 256. The training times from Table I are
also shown on the plot, and align nicely with our estimates.
Our analysis and empirical results on adversarial training
time demonstrate that while reducing the number of steps for
PGD does lead to significant reductions in training time, there
is also a clear benefit to computing PGD on smaller batch
sizes over multiple GPUs. Even for adversarial training with
7-step PGD, we see a large improvement in training time when
moving from 2 to 8 GPUs. For this paper, we focus solely on
the speedup due to the reduction in the number of gradient
computations and changes in the batch size via distributed
processing; however, we expect that other modifications, such
as adjustments to the learning rate schedule and mixed-
precision arithmetic (as demonstrated in [26]), will enable even
greater reductions in training time.
B. Robustness
While fast adversarial training with 1-step PGD clearly
leads to improvements in training time, it is only useful for
safety-critical applications if it achieves similar robustness to
multi-step PGD. Thus, we assess the robustness of our trained
models5 by computing their adversarial accuracy at varying
levels of perturbation strength. We evaluate the models at their
best epoch, and use 20-step PGD with 10 random restarts for
a range of  values (assuming the `2-norm) for this evaluation.
Refer to Figure 2 for these results. When tested against
smaller perturbations (lower ), the models trained with 1-step
PGD achieve higher adversarial accuracy than those trained
with 7-step PGD. At higher , however, the 7-step PGD models
achieve higher adversarial accuracy, and are thus considered
to be more robust. While 1-step PGD is not able to achieve
an exact match to 7-step PGD, these results suggest that it is
a useful approximation, as it achieves a much higher level of
robustness compared to the standard (no PGD) model.
C. Feature Representations
As suggested in [23], adversarial robustness acts as a prior
for learning human-aligned features, and we are interested in
qualitatively assessing the feature representations learned via
fast adversarial training to see if they preserve this notion of
interpretability. We study the feature representations of both
standard and robust models using three visualization methods6:
direct feature visualizations, image interpolation, and large
adversarial perturbations.
1) Direct Feature Visualizations: The direct feature visu-
alization for a given node, i, in the feature representation
layer (e.g., penultimate layer of the network) is computed as
follows: start from a seed image, x0 (either random noise or
a real image from the test set), and solve for an image x∗
that maximizes the activation at that node. Note that this can
be solved for using PGD, where the loss term is now equal
5For 7-step PGD for Restricted ImageNet, we use the pre-trained model
from [23].
6The examples we show in this section are randomly sampled and are rep-
resentative of the phenomena we consistently observe across many samples.
Fig. 1. Analysis of execution time required for `2-constrained PGD on CIFAR-10. Batch sizes and number of GPUs used to train the models in this paper
are highlighted by the solid boxes. (Left) Average time for execution of a single instance of PGD using a single GPU and varying batch size. “No PGD” is
represented by executing a single forward pass. (Middle) Estimate of lower bound on total training time using a single GPU and varying batch size. (Right)
Estimate of total training time given multiple GPUs and global batch size of 256. Actual training times from our experiments are indicated with stars.
Fig. 2. Adversarial accuracy as a function of maximum perturbation size
() for CIFAR-10 and Restricted ImageNet models trained against `2-norm
bounded perturbations. The black, dotted lines indicate the  used during
adversarial training.
to the value of the activation at the node of interest, fR,iθ (x).
In contrast to standard models, models trained for adversarial
robustness tend to have features that exhibit clear, often
recognizable patterns that persist across random initializations.
Refer to Figure 3 for direct feature visualizations for models
trained on Restricted ImageNet with standard training and
adversarial training using both 1- and 7-step PGD. Similar
to the features learned with 7-step PGD (albeit slightly less
complex), the feature representations from 1-step PGD have
distinct patterns that generally align with human perception,
and both adversarial training approaches show clear improve-
ment over standard training, whose features appear noise-like.
2) Image Interpolation: Image interpolation is performed
as follows: given two anchor images, x1 and x2, and an inter-
polation parameter, λ, solve for the λ-interpolated image, xλ,
by minimizing the distance between the current interpolation
and the desired interpolation in the representation space:
min
xλ
‖(λfRθ (x1)− (1− λ)fRθ (x2))− fRθ (xλ)‖2. (14)
This results in an image that has a similar representation
as the linearly interpolated points in representation space.
A robust model will provide meaningful and interpretable
representations where a nonrobust model cannot.
Fig. 3. Direct feature visualizations for models trained with standard training
and adversarial training with 1- and 7-step PGD. The first column is the seed
image, and the remaining 4 columns are the result of solving for the input
that maximizes 5 randomly sampled nodes from the representation layer.
In Figure 4, we show the results of performing interpolation
between two images for each of our models. Similar to 7-
step PGD, 1-step PGD has smoother transitions between the
interpolations compared to the model trained with standard
training. This suggests that training with a fast, approximate
solution to the inner objective in (5) still enables models to
learn feature representations that exhibit an increased level of
smoothness over those achieved with standard training.
3) Large Adversarial Perturbations: Large adversarial per-
turbations are found by solving for a large perturbation,
δ, in the direction of a target class, c. This is commonly
accomplished using PGD with large values for K and  (e.g.,
K = 1000 steps and  = 500), where the objective is to
minimize loss for the target class, L(fθ(x+δ), c). While large
adversarial perturbations for standard models tend to look like
noisy versions of the original image, for adversarially-robust
models, these perturbed images appear (to humans) similar to
the target class.
Figure 5 depicts images given large adversarial perturbations
for our three models. The perturbed images for the model
trained with 1-step PGD visually resemble the target class,
and show stark improvement over those for the model trained
via standard training, whose perturbed images appear almost
indistinguishable from the original class. The 1-step PGD
images are, perhaps, slightly less distinct compared to the
images for the model trained with 7-steps of PGD.
V. DISCUSSION
Our experiments demonstrate that fast adversarial training
with random initialization and 1-step PGD significantly re-
duces the time to train models that are robust to adversarial
perturbations constrained by the Euclidean norm, and is able
to achieve robustness and feature representations that are
similar to models trained using multi-step PGD. Future work
will include extending this approach to additional distance
measures (e.g., Wasserstein), and designing training schemes
that use a combination of the two methods (e.g., 1-step PGD
during earlier epochs, where an approximate solution may be
sufficient, and multi-step PGD in later epochs).
We find that training time can be further reduced by utilizing
distributed training, where multiple GPUs are used to process
smaller batches of data. We see a large reduction in training
time from 2 to 8 GPUs for 7-step PGD, and future work will
include designing distributed training regimes to improve the
efficiently of multi-step PGD. Such regimes will be needed
for applications that require higher levels of robustness.
The techniques discussed in this paper can be useful tools
for increasing the level of experimentation with robust models.
For example, fast adversarial training and distributed process-
ing may enable robust optimization to be run on large-scale
problems for which multi-step PGD is currently prohibitive.
Additionally, fast adversarial training can be used for initial
experiments when testing new techniques in a “back-of-the-
envelope” fashion, before using multi-step PGD for training
the final model. Due to its additional ability to learn human-
aligned features, fast adversarial training with the Euclidean
Fig. 4. Image interpolation for models trained with standard training and
adversarial training with 1- and 7-step PGD. The first and last row are the
anchor images, while the middle three rows are the interpolated images for
varying levels of λ for each of the three models.
Fig. 5. Large adversarial perturbations for models trained with standard
training and adversarial training with 1- and 7-step PGD. The first column is
the original images with their true labels (turtle and fish), while the remaining
columns show the adversarially-perturbed images that have been perturbed in
the direction of the target class (crab and insect) for each model.
norm may also be a great resource for the explainable AI
community.
VI. CONCLUSION
We extend the fast adversarial training approach from [26]
to the Euclidean norm, and find it to be a useful approximation
to traditional robust optimization with multi-step PGD. By
leveraging distributed training with multiple GPUs, we achieve
further reductions in training time. Neural networks that are
robust, interpretable, and quick to train will be important as
deep learning is increasingly applied to large-scale, safety-
critical problems.
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